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NOTES
THE HUMAN RIGHT OF COMMUNICATION*
I. GLOBAL COMMUNICATION PROCESS
Communication is intercourse among people; speaking, writing or
sending a television signal are but three of its many forms. This defini-
tion, however, inadequately describes the role which communication
plays on a global scale. One can go so far as to say that communication
is the motor and expression of social activity; it maintains and ani-
mates life.1 Communication performs the task of integrating knowledge
so that human beings can become interdependent. Communication
links all parts of the world together.
History has witnessed the rapid expansion of communication. In
the Stone Age, communication was limited to small groups of people
within earshot or, at best, within eyeshot of each other. Since that
time, however, as alphabets and literacy came into existence, commu-
nication has expanded. With the movement of peoples through Asia
Minor and into Europe and with the consequent development of lan-
guage, communication spread. By modern times, as literacy grew from
the possession of a minority to the possession of a majority, communi-
cation was opened to a majority of the world's population. It became a
global process. In short, communication has developed away from elit-
ism towards greater democratization. The most recent decades have
seen significant advances in technology which have tightened the
global hold of communication. The problem in light of these develop-
ments is "to open up the opportunities which exist in principle but are
still denied to the majority of the world's population.
'3
Communication fulfills several distinct functions.4 The broad
scope of these functions makes immediately clear the importance of
the problem of expanding communication. The first two func-
* This note is also scheduled for publication in the REVuE DE Daorr INTERNATIONAL,
which retains all European rights thereto.
1. UNESCO, Report by the International Commission for the Study of Communica-
tions Problems, MANY VOICES, ONE WORLD 3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as MAcBiDE
REPORT].
2. Id. at 3-13.
3. Id. at 13.
4. Id. at 14.
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tions-collecting, storing and processing of information; and filling a
social need by providing a common fund of knowledge in order to im-
prove social cohesion-are apparent from the definition of communica-
tion. Communication's functions are also linked to the eight value
processes outlined by Professor Myres S. McDougal.5 Communication
is a political instrument through which issues are debated and public
interest is generated; it is, therefore, closely tied to power. As an eco-
nomic resource like natural raw materials, communication is a form of
wealth or, at least, can create the information which leads to wealth. It
serves an obvious educational or enlightenment function as well. By
promoting culture, in attempting to preserve a past heritage and to
broaden future horizons, communication entails affection for other
members of a society. Communication can improve well-being by act-
ing as a conduit for advances in health care. As it disseminates both
entertainment and messages about ethical behavior (though the two
need not be mutually exclusive), it increases a community's attach-
ment to rectitude. Because communication serves an integrative pur-
pose as it strives to give all social groups an opportunity for access to
each other, it enhances respect. In this sense, respect can be considered
the core value for communication. Recent discussion, however, deals
with "conceptualization of information issues in political-economic
terms"' and thus suggests power as the base value for communication.
Clearly, power is needed in the form of access to information-gathering
and information-disseminating bodies in order to participate in the
global communication process. Communication is the means through
which ideas flow and perspectives change; it is the carrier of ideas
about values and is, therefore, central to any community process based
on the shaping and sharing of values. People can have ideas regarding
values, however, only if they have been enlightened. From this perspec-
tive, therefore, enlightenment is a base value for communication.
5. M. McDoUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBuc ORDER
85 (1980). The eight values are as follows:
Respect: Freedom of choice, equality and recognition
Power: Making and influencing community decisions
Enlightenment: Gathering, processing, and disseminating information and knowledge
Well-being: Safety, health, and comfort
Wealth: Production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services; control of
resources
Skill: Acquisition and exercise of capabilities in vocations, professions, and the arts
Affection: Intimacy, friendship, loyalty; positive sentiments
Rectitude: Participation in forming and applying norms of responsible conduct
Id.
6. O'Brien & Helleiner, The Political Economy of Information in a Changing Inter-
national Economic Order, 34 INT'L ORG. 470 (1980).
[Vol. 4
RIGHT OF COMMUNICATION
This discussion shows that more than one value can be considered
as core in the global communication process. At times these values con-
flict. For example, in order to maintain its position, a power elite may
try to deprive others of the right to enlightenment. Conversely, those
people who are enlightened, such as academicians, may be far from
power and may even be actively excluded therefrom.
In recent years, nations and their leaders have come to realize that
communication and its product, information, lie "at the root of sover-
eignty."'7 This recognition arose as "the inevitability of domination
[which] is . . . built into the Western conception of the world" be-
came more apparent in the minds of non-Western leaders. They have
increasingly raised questions concerning why some forms of history-
writing should be considered "news" or why those standards of verac-
ity which they believe were originally set by the West are now globally
held.9 The free flow of information which they see as having been es-
tablished by the West as an ideal in fact "merely swamps the culture
of others."10 In short, they fear that communication may have brought
the non-Western countries" into a condition of cultural dependence on
the West. This dependence manifests itself in, for instance, book pub-
lishing, tourism and the sale of communication equipment from the
First to the Third World.
Developments in communication technology have aggravated the
cultural dependence problem. Among these advances are satellite and
computer technology which accelerate the flow of information. This
technology has made information to the West what certain natural re-
sources, such as oil or minerals, are to the South. Because of the new
tools of communication, information has become "a social resource of a
special kind, rather than a produced commodity.""2 To use Blacking's
model, information is the product of the process of communication."3
7. A. SMITH, THE GEOPOLITICS OF INFORMATION: How WESTERN CULTURE DOMINATES
THE WORLD 58 (1980).
8. Id. at 24.
9. Id. at 22.
10. Id. at 37.
11. For expositional purposes, nations known as the "non-West," South, Third World
or Lesser Developed Countries hereinafter will be collectively referred to as the Third
World in this note. The groups of countries making up the North, West and First World
will be collectively referred to as the West. These are concededly gross oversimplifica-
tions, but for the purpose of discussing the world communication debate, it is sufficient
to use the above terminology. This caveat is occasionally ignored in the text when greater
specificity is required.
12. A. SMITH, supra note 7, at 114.
13. Inaugural Lecture by Professor John Blacking, University of the Witwatersrand
Johannesburg, Process and Product in Human Society (September 13, 1967). The Black-
19821
N.Y.J. INT'L & COMP. L.
The Third World therefore may not have a legitimate grievance with
the West. Communication is just an example of how more rapid devel-
opments in Western culture regarding communication have made its
product, information, Western-dominated; no Western will to domi-
nate is implied. This caveat raises questions about the cultural depen-
dence argument but does not destroy it entirely. One product of cul-
ture-information-serves to permit the processes of one culture to
dominate the processes of other cultures.
Another objection to the cultural dependence argument is the
opinion that the Third World is protesting not against Western norms
but against accepted international norms which were codified in bodies
with legitimate power to make international law. For instance, the
right to "receive and impart information and ideas through any media
and regardless of frontiers" '1 4 is guaranteed by the United Nations.
This right is also a summary of the free flow argument against which
the South vehemently protests. Nonetheless, the South today would
strongly uphold the right of the United Nations to make international
law. The South may, however, contend that at the time when the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights15 was signed, the U.N. was not a
legitimate legislative body because the West so completely dominated
it. The notion that human rights can change in varying social contexts
would support the Southern view. The changed social order of the
1970's opens room for questioning rights agreed upon in a social order
of the 1940's when the West predominated.
The right to communication is part of the new era or generation of
human rights. The first generation included civil and political rights;
the second, economic, social and cultural rights; the third, planetary
concerns which have taken on "a renewed urgency."1 8 This new set of
rights, which includes communication, is of both a collective and indi-
vidual nature, and synthesizes existing rights with new ideas. While the
notion of a new era of rights is exciting and places communication
problems at the cutting edge of international law, it should be recog-
nized that some hostility toward this idea exists. In particular, some
ing model purports that there is a clear distinction between the product of Man and the
process of Man. The product of Man is the result of cultural and technological develop-
ments. The process of Man focuses on the human or moral development of Man (i.e.,
what makes Man "Man"). Id.
14. U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(111), U.N. Doc. A/
810, at 71 (1948).
15. Id.




people feel that if claims or values are "indiscriminately proclaimed"'17
as human rights, the whole conception of what constitutes human
rights will be trivialized.
The dynamic nature of human rights and of overall development
responds to this complaint. Human rights can change or expand as so-
cial contexts change. The social order of today differs from that of
sixty years ago and certainly from that of two hundred years ago. More
people are now considered legitimate actors in the social process. The
right to inform and to be informed, therefore, in a world of ever-grow-
ing and ever-changing actors, should be viewed as a legitimate human
right. While the existence of philosophical debate over the legitimacy
of communication as a human right should be noted, such debate is
beyond the scope of this note. For present purposes, it will be assumed
that the right to communicate is a legitimate human right.
II. CLAIMS TO COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION
The present analysis of communication will proceed on the basis
of the McDougal model, which contends that human rights are a result
of the shaping and sharing of values.s This model places great empha-
sis on the presence of a human rights facet in all human interactions,
most certainly including communication. McDougal posits the exis-
tence of a set of universal values, evinced by the international bill of
human rights, among which respect lies at the core. All human beings,
according to McDougal, are entitled to respect. Values are oriented to
the individual, and McDougal insists on developing human rights from
the point of view of the individual rather than of the larger actors,
such as nation-states.1 9
This view is distinct from what can be referred to as the Soviet
conception of human rights, which sees these rights as opportunities
granted by the state rather than as an individual's claims on the
state.20 The Soviets emphasize the educational role these rights play in
the transformation of the New Soviet Man. While civil and political
rights lie at the heart of most Western conceptions of human rights,
collective economic rights, most notably the right to work, are at the
base of the Soviet conception. Only through the collective, according to
Soviet jurists, can the individual attain his full potential; his rights
must therefore be linked to those of the collective. Accordingly, the
17. Id. at 451.
18. M. McDoUOAL, H. LASSwELL & L. CHEN, supra note 5, at 84.
19. Id.
20. Dean, Beyond Helsinki: The Soviet View of Human Rights in International Law,
21 VA. J. INT'L L. 55, 75 (1980).
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Soviets can justify restrictions on the right to communication by saying
that the individual's freedom to communicate may prejudice the rights
of society as a whole.21 The Soviets avoid the problems posed by the
fact that they are signatories to various international documents which
uphold freedom to communicate, by their doctrine which maintains
that states, not individuals, are the subjects of international law; im-
plementation means "adjusting international norms to be consistent
with the social, economic, and political characteristics of the Soviet
Union."22 The Soviet State and not international agreements create,
define and implement the rights of the Soviet people.
Because the premise of this note is that freedom to communicate
is a legitimate and basic human right, it would be pointless to work
with the Soviet model if one bears in mind that the purpose of the
model is designative, rather than preferential. Such a framework justi-
fies enough restraints on communication as to question whether indi-
viduals should be free to inform and to be informed. On the other
hand, the policy-oriented approach of McDougal, 23 by virtue of its con-
ception of eight core values, several of which are basic to the right to
communicate, strongly supports the individual's freedom of expression
and discussion. Additionally, because it emphasizes the rights of the
individual rather than the rights of the state, it necessarily is more
sympathetic than the Soviet approach, which advances the individual's
freedom only at the expense of the state. Using the McDougal frame-
work, then, one notes alleged deprivations which have occurred in the
shaping and sharing of values in the global communication process.
These nonfulfillments have led to the particular claims embodied in
the New International Information Order (NIIO).
Before a systematic treatment of these claims is attempted, it
would be useful to list some of the factors which have convinced those
members of the Third World responsible for the NIIO to make their
claims.2" The unmistakably growing world interdependence, especially
as manifested in the expanding role of communication, underlies any
claim for a new sense of sovereignty in the South as former colonies
gained their independence. Independence has made these new states
feel more self-sufficient. Consequently, they resent outside (particu-
larly Western) interference in their internal affairs. Related to this new
21. Id.
22. Id. at 76.
23. M. McDoUOAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 5, at 85.
24. Richstad & Anderson, Policy Context for News and a New Order, in CRISIS IN




sovereignty is the wider focus on ideas of dominance and dependence.25
The new communication technology and the simultaneous rise in con-
cern about the impact of technology on national development may
have provided the impetus for finally voicing claims for a new order.
Despite the interdependence of value processes, it would be easiest
to treat the NIIO claims first as they relate to the deprivation of en-
lightenment and later as they relate to wealth and the other values.
This note will discuss the alleged deprivations and associated claims as
they refer to each of the six institutional factors. One should remem-
ber, however, that these nonfulfillments and claims can also be inter-
preted in terms of power or respect. In fact, the three base values over-
lap to a large degree in the NIIO proposals and are sometimes difficult
to separate.
NIIO proponents claim that "a flagrant quantitative imbalance be-
tween North and South"2 in communication currently exists. "Almost
80 percent of the world news flow emanates from the major transna-
tional agencies; ... This results in a veritable de facto monopoly on
the part of the developed countries.""7 Consequently, the NIIO is mak-
ing a claim for increasing the number of Third World participants in
the communication process in order to democratize it further as a
means to improve Third World enlightenment. This is not a demand to
increase the absolute number of participants in global communication;
such a result, according to the NIIO, would merely increase Western
dominance. Rather, it is a desire to add to the Third World's share in
the communication process.
The NIIO's broadest claims lie perhaps in regard to perspectives.
It sees the West possessing "a de facto hegemony and a will to domi-
nate '28 which manifests itself in "the indifference of the media in the
developed countries, particularly in the West, to the problems, con-
cerns, and aspirations of the developing countries." 2' These biased per-
spectives of Western journalists become apparent in the news sent
from the Third World which reflects the "survival of the colonial
era."30 The NIIO's proponents argue that Western coverage of Third
World events concentrates on natural and political disasters and not
on "development news" which would, for example, describe current ad-
vances in schooling or health care. In the Third World view, such news
would expand enlightenment. The West's perspective on which events
25. Id. at 10.
26. Masmoudi, The New World Information Order, 29 J. Com. 172 (1979).
27. Id. at 172-73.
28. Id. at 173.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 174.
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make up "news" is thus the subject of the NIIO's severe criticism.
The NIIO also makes claims relating to situations of enlighten-
ment. Because much of the news received in the Third World is actu-
ally transmitted from broadcasting centers in the West and is, for that
reason, edited to meet the needs of Western audiences, "messages [are]
ill-suited to the areas in which they are disseminated."' Western mass
media coverage "disregards the impact of the news beyond [its] own
frontiers. They even ignore the important minorities and foreign com-
munities living on their national territory .... "132 The NIIO, therefore,
makes claims to constitute and advance its own institutions of enlight-
enment such as regional and national news agencies. The issue of crisis
situations is tied to the NIIO claims that too often Western reportage
depicts the Third World's crises and not its accomplishments. A secon-
dary claim in this regard is that in times of crisis in the West, news of
the Third World is completely disregarded. Underlying these claims
seems to be the belief that the West is the locus of all international
action. It is possible to conclude that the Third World is simply voicing
an inferiority complex, but that conclusion is suspect in light of the
quantitative dominance of the West in information transmission.
The claims of the NIIO with regard to the authority and control
over enlightenment as a base value are perhaps the most controversial
claims of all. Because of what they perceive as biased reporting, Third
World governments are demanding the right to limit the flow of infor-
mation to that which, in their view, does not portray them in an unfair
or, as Western critics would say, negative light. This claim clearly has
serious consequences for Western standards involving freedom of the
press and the rights of journalists as investigative reporters even when
their findings are harmful to the subjects of their inquiry. Tied to the
claim for control is the demand for help from the West in setting up
national news agencies which would tend to portray the Third World
nation-state more favorably than would Western reporters. The
South's specific complaint about the "ineffectiveness of the right of
correction" 8  relates as well to its demand for greater control over the
means to enlightenment so that the "errors" would not have occurred
in the first place.
The central question involving strategies relates to "[c]laims for
freedom in access to and employment of mass communication."" The
NIIO supporters claim that "[a]n inequality in information resources"
31. Id.
32. Id. at 175.
33. Id.
34. M. McDoUGAL, H. LAsswJ & L. CHEN, supra note 5, at 152.
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exists because "[t]he five major transnational agencies monopolize be-
tween them the essential share of material and human potential.'3
These inequities are also present in the broadcast spectra. Conse-
quently, the Third World feels unable to promote its views on commu-
nication and to present the news as it sees it. In the field of informa-
tion, where the ideological strategy is so important, the South feels
that this very strategy is closed to it.
The NIIO claims with regard to outcomes include all the claims
heretofore mentioned. Suffice it to say that the outcome the NIIO pro-
ponents desire would bring about a controlled flow of information
where, at the very least, more information than at present would be
favorable to the Third World. Such a controlled flow would theoreti-
cally improve enlightenment by giving people a "truer" version of the
news. It would increase their power by channeling information nar-
rowly, and would foster respect by giving all people the same informa-
tion drawn from a limited number of sources.
Although the rhetoric of some of these claims is excessively harsh,
each claim has a kernel of legitimacy insofar as it is made in regard to
true cultural dependence. True cultural dependence is dependence on
uniquely Western values or institutions, but not dependence on inter-
national norms confused with Western norms. An example of true cul-
tural dependence is Western numerical predominance among the par-
ticipants in the communication process; this dominance necessarily
means that the press coverage of the Third World will have a Western
slant. Similarly, the claim to de facto Western hegemony is legitimate
to the extent that this hegemony encourages or maintains the Third
World's dependence on the West for its news. It is no longer clear that
the West consciously intends cultural domination over the Third
World. The West has good reason not to aggravate its problems with
the Third World because it depends on the Third World for many of
its natural resources. Any obvious attempts to dominate increase the
risk of cutting off that supply. The de facto hegemony does not auto-
matically imply a will to dominate.
Thus far, this note has considered the NIIO claims primarily in
regard to enlightenment. However, as Professor McDougal cogently ar-
gues, all eight values are interdependent.8 6 The NIIO recognizes the
particular interdependence of enlightenment and wealth. Advocates of
the NIIO believe that: "The establishment of a new world information
order must be considered the essential corollary of the new interna-
35. Masmoudi, supra note 26, at 173.
36. M. McDoUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHFN, supra note 5, at 84-85.
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tional economic order. '87 While NIIO supporters claim that this
linkage is apparent, other people have seriously disagreed. "The New
World Information Order is another vehicle and/or attempt by the
Third World to use diplomatic and ideological strategies to obtain a
decision-making role in the market economy via the telecommunica-
tions industry."" The linkage may be no more than a ploy by Third
World leaders for more development assistance. Doubt centers on
whether the Third World actively supports the expansion of enlighten-
ment or whether it simply wants to use enlightenment as means to gain
financial support to keep existing power elites in control.
Even if the New International Economic Order (NIEO) is under-
stood as a claim for distributive justice, the means it suggests towards
achieving that goal are exclusively economic and rest largely on the
value of wealth. Although wealth is the base value in NIEO, other base
values, such as power or respect, exist in NIEO. But to the extent that
wealth is a base value, the NIIO/NIEO linkage is suspicious. It is im-
possible to be certain that wealth will be used to better the well-being
of Third World residents and not to solidify the position of power
elites and thus prevent distributive justice within and among the na-
tions demanding NIEO. If power is the base value, then, the NIIO/
NIEO combination risks still more than either of the orders alone: the
continuation of oppressive governments in parts of the Third World.
It should be determined whether the NIIO claims as a whole are
too narrow. The question arises as to why NUO supporters draw a con-
nection only between enlightenment (or respect or power) and wealth.
The NIIO proposals largely neglect the other values. One wonders
whether Mustapha Masmoudi, formerly Tunisian Secretary of State
for Information and currently Ambassador to UNESCO,39 and the
other proponents of the NIIO limit their interdependence to wealth
alone because they fear that claims based on other interdependences
would unmask the weak human rights record of many Third World
states. The demand for wealth illustrates the current existence of pov-
erty; this condition is not a source of shame, and is often ironically
considered reason for pride. On the other hand, tying demands for
communication and enlightenment to a demand for wider religious tol-
eration (i.e. broader shaping and sharing of rectitude) would show that
presently freedom of religion is not the norm in those states making
the claims. Religious intolerance is the fault of the home government,
37. Masmoudi, supra note 26, at 185.
38. M. Groeschel, The International Information Order: Diplomatic and Ideological
Strategies of the Third World and/or Nonaligned Countries to Achieve the Goals of the
New International Economic Order 1 (March 16, 1982) (unpublished manuscript).
39. Masmoudi, supra note 26, at 172.
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not of the West. Communication could also be used to spread informa-
tion about medical care and well-being. This might conflict with ex-
isting cultural traditions which do not lead to the widest possible avail-
ability of expert health care. In some nations, poorer, rural people do
not know of even the existence of some diseases; were they to find out,
they might stage large-scale protests against their government for hav-
ing previously withheld that information. At the very least, then, it is
clear that the NIIO/NIEO link is too narrow and subjective.
Numerous responses have been offered to the NIIO proposals.
Three which merit special attention are the Soviet, European and
United States responses. The Soviets strongly support the NIIO be-
cause "a country enjoying 'unlimited' freedom limits the freedom of
others. Absolute freedom to inform other countries irrespective of their
desires compromises their freedom.' 40 All nations must be free to ad-
mit or reject information and must not, therefore, be forced to accept
the information which is given them by Western news agencies. The
Soviets claim that the Western "term 'free flow of information' may in
fact be a synonym of cold war, because in this kind of war, it is words,
not guns, which carry on the combat."" Consequently, UNESCO's
1978 Mass Media Declaration, which used the phrase "free flow and a
wider and better balanced dissemination of information,"" represents
a victory for the East-South alliance which supports NIIO.
The European view of NIIO holds that the chief accomplishment
of the Mass Media Declaration is that all members of the international
community, but particularly the Western bloc, now recognize
UNESCO as the matrix for debate over communication. On the other
hand, because the document did not embody some of the more extreme
NIIO demands such as licensing journalists, the 1978 UNESCO Con-
ference was a "setback for the Soviet Union.""
The extreme United States response holds that the argument that
a state can shape opinions is seductive; the premise that a link exists
between news and development, an assumption which lies at the heart
of NIIO claims, remains unproven. The polar case of the Soviet Union
illustrates that in a country where the press is completely con-
40. Androunas & Zassoursky, Protecting the Sovereignty of Information, 29 J. CoM.
186 (1979).
41. Id. at 187.
42. The Declaration of Fundamental Principles Concerning the Contribution of the
Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding, The Promotion of
Human Rights and to Countering Racialism, Apartheid and Incitement to War,
UNESCO Res. 4/9.3/2, 20 UNESCO Gen. Conf. Res., UNESCO Doc. 20C/Resolutions at
100-04 (1978).
43. Righter, Who Won?, 29 J. CoM. 192 (1979).
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trolled,there is no guarantee of economic success. Another complaint
against the NIIO is that it demonstrates a "clear bias against private
sector involvement in communications." 4 The statism inherent in the
NIIO, according to the extreme United States position, conflicts with 5
Article 19 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights.4" Finally, this argu-
ment maintains that the NIIO is an attempt to take advantage of the
tensions necessarily present in an open Western system of information
and that it is a blatant ploy to prejudice Western interests.
A more moderate United States view argues that the NIIO is valid
to the extent that it reflects legitimate grievances about cultural de-
pendence.47 This opinion points to what it sees as a justifiable plural-
ism in the values of the contemporary world. The proponents of this
opinion recognize that imbalances exist in the extent to which people
are free to communicate effectively with one another. In addition, this
moderate response suggests that particular NIIO claims be examined
more carefully and that the entire proposal not be dismissed out-of-
hand. It has become apparent that "the Third World means to have its
news heard and understood wherever it chooses.' 4 Both the extreme
and the moderate United States responses object to the deprivation of
the free flow of information.
As a response to the NIIO, the West has begun to formulate
claims of its own in regard to communication. These demands tend to
favor a reassertion of the relevant portions of the U.N. Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights4" and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights,50 while taking into account some of the more le-
gitimate claims of the Third World. The Western claims are not as well
dveloped as the claims of the NIIO because communication is not as
important an issue in the West as in the Third World, and because
Western responses have only recently begun to take form. The West
44. Theberge, UNESCO's "New World Information Order". Colliding with First
Amendment Values, 67 A.B.A. J. 714, 716 (1981).
45. Id. at 718.
46. U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 14. "Everyone has the
right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions
without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any
media and regardless of frontiers." Id.
47. Rutkowski, More on the "New World Information Order", 67 A.B.A. J. 1274
(1981).
48. Sussman, The Western Media and the Third World's Challenge, in CRISIS IN
INTERNATIONAL NEWS: POLICIES AND PROSPECTS 344, 345 (J. Richstad & M. Anderson eds.
1981).
49. U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 14.
50. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
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has long considered freedom of expression an inalienable right. It is
protected by most, if not all, Western constitutions, and the idea that
communication can interfere with another's security-except in the
most extreme circumstances-has never been taken too seriously. Now,
in response to Third World claims, the West has had to crystallize a
response.
III. WORLD CONSTITUTIVE PROCESS
Thus far, a discussion of the demands various groups are making
in respect to communication has been presented. This section will de-
scribe the institutions already in place to resolve the competing claims
of the West and South. Space limitations preclude a detailed study of
the whole constitutive process. Therefore, those elements of the consti-
tutive process which are of greatest importance to the trade-off be-
tween freedom of communication and danger to Third World develop-
ment will be highlighted.
As outlined in the MacBride Report" and elsewhere, one can iden-
tify quite a few participants in the communication process." First is
the individual who participates because of his desire to know, impart
and discuss information. Without this information, the individual can-
not be an informed citizen and thus may be alienated from the com-
munity's political process. Second, groups and voluntary organizations,
both legal and illegal, provide fora for debate. 8 An example of this
kind of participant is an international writers' network. Third are com-
munities, such as the nation-state, which are smaller than the global
community. The reactions generated in these groups as they receive
and digest information help to determine global community policies. A
fourth set of participants is private and public institutions. Included
prominently among private institutions are the mass media, particu-
larly such transnational news agencies as the Associated Press. Closely
related is the fifth participant, national and transnational corporations,
especially those producing software and advertising. Sixth are various
groups of professionals, such as journalists or academicians. Because
journalism is increasingly recognized as a legitimate profession
throughout the world, there is a growing emphasis on higher profes-
sional standards. The following discussion will focus on transnational
51. MAcBRIDE REPORT, supra note 1, at 112-22.
52. Id. at 284-87. In the report, four major models for the study of communication
are listed. These four models are derived from: (1) the concept of the discrete communi-
cation system; (2) psycho-social inspiration; (3) cultural or anthropological inspiration;
and (4) "institutional" approaches inspired by the political sciences. Id.
53. Id. at 114.
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news agencies (TNNAs), journalists, academicians and nation-states
because of their predominant role in the communication process.
TNNAs are an important participant if only because of their size.
The main TNNAs are Associated Press, United Press International,
Reuters and Agence France-Presse. AP and UPI are headquartered in
the United States, Reuters in England and AFP in France. One exam-
ple will illustrate the operational scope of these organizations. AP has
an annual budget of $100 million. It maintains 80 United States-based
correspondents and 750 correspondents abroad. More than 1300
United States newspapers and more than 3000 radio and television sta-
tions subscribe to it.5" Because of their size, during the 1970's these
agencies transformed themselves from transnational news agencies to
transnational information services. 5 They broadened their base from
news of day-to-day crises and events to include issues which are of
wider scope but still immediate importance.
The stated goal of each TNNA is objectivity. As should now be
apparent, interpretations of "objectivity" vary around the globe. Third
World criticism of TNNAs centers not only on the objectivity issue,
but also on their impact and control over the international information
flow and on their use of common resources such as telephone wires."
They have come in for especially harsh criticism in regard to the per-
ceived imbalance in information flow; they are accused of flooding the
Third World with the news they gather to cater to their more lucrative
Western markets and of not presenting the West with a balanced pic-
ture of the Third World.57 Particular Southern complaints are that
young, inexperienced reporters are often assigned to the Third World,
and that local stringers are frequently incompetent and poorly paid."
In addition, Western reporters tend to travel in packs to places of cri-
sis and thus neglect events in Third World nations not experiencing
crises. The South has also protested what it sees as a gap purposely
created by the TNNAs between themselves and the national news
agencies. s9
The agencies have been victims of physical harassment. There
have been cases of deportation and imprisonment of correspondents as
54. Rosenblum, Reporting from the Third World, in CRSIS IN INTERNATIONAL NEws:
POLICIES AND PROSPECTS 221, 224-25 (J. Richatad & M. Anderson eds. 1981).
55. Richstad, Transnational News Agencies: Issues and Policies, in CRISIS IN INTER-
NATIONAL NEWS: POLICIES AND PROSPECTS 242, 255 (J. Richstad & M. Anderson eds.
1981).
56. Id. at 246-47.





well as attempts to browbeat or punish them for writing stories that
have not portrayed the government in a favorable light.60 The TNNAs
refute the Third World claim that they "write off"' the Third World in
order to increase their profits; UPI has not run a profit for the past
twenty years.6" Although other TNNAs have been more successful
financially, they still lose money covering the Third World."
The people who actually gather the news for the TNNAs and
smaller agencies are also important participants in the communication
process. Three broad questions have been raised concerning journalists
as they gather information."
The first relates to the reporter's physical protection, which the
West has long considered the obligation of the host country. The Sovi-
ets have taken this idea and expanded-or corrupted-it so that jour-
nalists, in its view, should be licensed. Obviously, host governments
would have great leeway in choosing whom to license and could thus
influence the news reporting of the West. Western agencies and jour-
nalists strongly oppose licensing."
The second question deals with the professional ethics of the
press. To what extent should the press be self-regulating? The prece-
dent for press codes began at the Pan-American Press Conference of
1926.65 These voluntary codes have usually included general statements
about objectivity, truthfulness and the necessity of freedom of infor-
mation. While many Westerners feel that these press codes would solve
a large number of the problems raised by NIIO claims, the new order's
proponents view the codes as merely one possible solution.
The third concern regarding journalists is the right of correction
and reply. Although the right to challenge and respond to news reports
exists in Europe, it is a source for debate in other countries. Again, the
question of cultural biases is raised in the context of what constitutes a
"wrong" or "inaccurate" story. At the very least, however, it seems
clear that the right to communicate must include the right to correct.
Academicians, as a group, include university scholars, members of
"think-tanks" and conceivably even scholars like writers or poets who
are in exile or are otherwise persona non grata. They participate in the
communication process by taking responsibility for discovering or syn-
60. MAcBRIDz REPORT, supra note 1, at 235.
61. Tremaine, Problems of International Coverage, in CRIsIs IN INTERNATIONAL
NEws: POLICIES AND PROSPECTS 277 (J. Richstad & M. Anderson eds. 1981).
62. See Fuller, AP: Covering the World, in CRsIS IN INTERNATIONAL NEWS: POLICIES
AND PROSPECTS 271, 273 (J. Richstad & M. Anderson eds. 1981).
63. MAcBRIDz REPORT, supra note 1, at 234-49.
64. See id. at 237-38.
65. MAcBRIDE REPORT, supra note 1, at 243.
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thesizing much of the knowledge which flows throughout the world.
The question of independence obviously affects the work of these
scholars. Governments can try to force them to arrive at certain
preconceived ideas, as occurred in the Soviet Union during Lysenko-
ism." For that matter, professors who are also employed by private
corporations as consultants might be less than free in their ability to
participate in the communication process. The fact that academicians
may be exiled or subjected to physical violence shows that they are
susceptible to pressures which attempt to limit their freedom to create
information.
A fourth participant in the constitutive process is the nation-state.
Governments participate by legislating rights of communication, by us-
ing communication resources in central planning, by assigning facilities
to private firms for telecommunications and by publicly controlling the
media.617 In the Soviet Union, the press-newspapers, radio, televi-
sion-is completely government-controlled; in South Africa, all of the
Afrikaans newspapers are under government supervision. While central
control of the media can avoid the problem of excessive commercializa-
tion, it obviously can also lead to great restrictions on the flow of infor-
mation. All governments-dictatorial and democratic-are involved to
some extent in the communication process as they limit access to infor-
mation which is harmful to national security.
Each of these four participants maintains its own perspective re-
garding the communication process. The news agencies have become
increasingly vocal in response to the Third World criticism described
above. They argue that their role and capabilities are often misunder-
stood in the Third World even though they openly admit to practicing
a "journalism of exception. ' '" Because it is physically impossible for
them to cover all the news around the world, they must concentrate on
the news which will sell in their primary markets; namely, the West.
TNNAs identify largely with Western communication policies, and
while claiming objectivity, cannot help following some degree of West-
ern bias, if only because of their Western ownership and staff.
Journalists and reporters demand the freedom to gather informa-
tion and to avoid harassment and torture in performing their jobs.
They see themselves as ombudsmen for the citizenry as a whole, and
believe that their rights are simply extensions of the rights of individu-
66. Lysenkoism refers to a revolt against intellectualism and science, particularly the
science of genetics, that arose in Soviet Russia in the 1930's. It is named for its progeni-
tor, Trofim D. Lysenko, President of the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sci-
ences and Director of the Institute of Genetics. 17 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMEMCANA 892 (1978).
67. MACBIDE REPORT, supra note 1, at 253-75.
68. Richstad, supra note 55, at 253.
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als. Nonetheless, journalists are responsible for considering the rights
of others and for respecting legitimate national security claims. Those
journalists who work for Third World national news agencies may find
themselves in a slightly different position, as their governments may be
more cooperative; however, they are usually as unable as Western re-
porters to obtain (with the right to publish) sensitive information.
Academicians as a rule demand the broadest possible freedom of
information and the broadest possible freedom from outside interfer-
ence. Their perspectives are at times unclear: when working for the
government, they are faced with the dilemma of obtaining and using
full knowledge, and of not finding or discussing information which
would be harmful to the government supporting them.
Nation-states demand the freedom to improve their own position
or the position of their allies. They may, therefore, be forced to restrict
the flow of information and to identify themselves with the more re-
pressive elements of society. Political, economic and moral factors can
all color the way a government behaves.
UNESCO is important as an arena for debate and development of
policies. It is a successful forum because it can work with national
groups and specialized institutions, and has especially wide access to
communication data.6" Because it is always studying communication is-
sues, its actions and decisions can go beyond mere reaction to crisis
events. Western groups such as TNNAs have sharply criticized
UNESCO for having become a propaganda forum for the Third World.
While this belief may be justified, the situation is unavoidable because
the Third World is the dominant bloc in the United Nations itself.79
UNESCO in fact limits the number of participants in the communica-
tion debate because only nation-states are allowed to take part in
UNESCO fora and discussions.71 Private individuals and organizations
are more or less excluded from the decision-making process.
Clearly, UNESCO is currently the only matrix for international
debate about communication. No other organization is capable of legit-
imately making communication policy for the world. It considers com-
munication from the point of view of enlightenment as the base value.
However, one must consider the very real possibility that the matrix of
debate will shift. The most likely new arena is the United Nations
General Assembly. Such a result would serve to focus more world at-
69. Richstad & Anderson, supra note 24, at 31.
70. The newly emerged nations of Africa and Asia now constitute a majority of the
United Nations General Assembly. 27 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 450 (1978).
71. UNITED NATIONS, EVERYMAN'S UNITED NATIONS: A COMPLEm HANDBOOK OF THE
ACTIVITIES AND EVOLUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS DURING ITS FIRST TwNTY YEARS,
1945-1965, at 503-04 (8th ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as A CompLRr HANDBOOK].
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tention on this issue. Because the General Assembly is the actual legis-
lative branch of the U.N. 2 and is not a U.N. subsidiary as is
UNESCO 7 individuals might have the chance to play a greater role in
resolving communication issues, if only because some channels do exist
for direct individual appeal to the U.N. In addition, because the Gen-
eral Assembly is a parliamentary rather than education-oriented body,
it will consider the issue from a broader perspective. Power and respect
could join or replace enlightenment as base values. Were the matrix of
debate to shift completely out of the U.N. to a separate body devoted
exclusively to studying communication problems, the possibility exists
that groups indirectly affected by the communication process, such as
peace movements, will be able to become more involved.
At the outset it was explained that the communication process
contains several base values. This conclusion is apparent from studying
the base values of the four important participants. TNNAs, journalists
and academicians all devote their efforts, at least superficially, to im-
proving enlightenment. All governments which have signed the Univer-
sal Declaration 7 or the ICCPR78 are expressly devoted to that goal as
well. The participants do, however, have other goals. Journalists and
TNNAs are also committed to power. A press which holds certain po-
litical views may try to communicate those beliefs to its audience, so
that they will vote the way the press desires. Through its audience, the
press can indirectly achieve political power. A state which controls the
flow of information does so in order to maintain or increase its power
over the population. By trying to give people access to information
about themselves, their governments and the world around them, jour-
nalists, TNNAs, and academicians act with respect as their base value.
The strategies used by the various participants to achieve their
goals also vary. TNNAs and journalists primarily use the ideological
strategy to spread their views on the need for a free press. In print or
on the air, they argue to make their perspectives known. To the extent
that the governments of the states where these participants have their
headquarters follow policies that reflect the desires of the press (as is
the case in much of the West), TNNAs and journalists use the diplo-
matic and economic strategies employed by nation-states. Govern-
ments engage in diplomacy either bilaterally or in organizations like
UNESCO to convince others of their views concerning communication.
In providing economic and technical assistance to improve Third
72. U.N. CHARTER arts. 9-20.
73. A CoMPLEr HANDBOOK, supra note 71, at 503-04.
74. U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 14.
75. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 50.
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World journalism, Western governments employ the economic strategy.
Academicians are in a position similar to that of TNNAs and journal-
ists. Because scholars are generally more independent from the govern-
ment than is the press, however, they are forced to rely to a larger
extent on the ideological strategy. None of the participants employs
the military strategy in regard to communication.
One cannot be an effective decision-maker without having access
to information. In a global decision-making process, the need for infor-
mation and communication is still greater than in a national process
because of the higher level of complexity. The communication process,
therefore, is central to the whole constitutive process. The social effec-
tiveness which lies at the heart of the constitutive process is lacking in
the absence of a viable communication process.
IV. POSTULATION OF GLOBAL POLICIES
The foregoing outline of the global communication process, the
claims process and the constitutive process has delimited the problem
of communication. In brief, the problem is the trade-off between the
broadest possible shaping and sharing of enlightenment and the dam-
age which such free flow of information causes to developing societies.
Two polar extremes-controlled flow and free flow-have been
suggested as policy alternatives."6 An examination of these two postu-
lations, a description of their strengths and weaknesses and a proposed
compromise policy that best serves the needs of all the participants in
the communication process follows.
Before discussing the merits and flaws of the controlled and free
flow positions, a definition of terms is in order. "Flow" means the
movement of information-words, ideas, pictures--from one part of
the world to another.77 This flow occurs in the print and broadcast me-
dia. It is subject to government limitation by censorship, harassment,
or other restrictions. "Controlled" does not imply government at-
tempts to stop the flow of information. Rather, it means limiting the
types of information that are available to general audiences: what type
of news, for example, people can read in their newspapers.7 8 Controlled
flow involves a qualitative but not necessarily quantitative restriction
in the movement of information. In fact, governments which pursue
controlled flow may make a conscious attempt to maintain the same
number of books or newspapers or television programs so that there is
no apparent reduction in the amount of information people receive. On
76. See Sussman, supra note 48, at 348-51.
77. See generally MAcBRmE REPoRT, supra note 1, at 137-44.
78. See id. at 138.
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the other hand, "free" flow implies freedom of choice for the audience
in choosing their sources of information. No outside interference can
stand in their way by limiting the choices available to them. Obviously,
free flow is not absolute because of legitimate national security needs.
Free flow is the closest possible situation to that where all desired in-
formation is available openly.
The proponents of limited or controlled flow believe that the free
flow of information helps only industrially developed nations Third
World nations should, therefore, impose controls on the flow of infor-
mation and culture to avoid undue Western influence, to increase their
own capabilities of information production and to force themselves to
train needed media personnel. These proponents also argue that infor-
mation-exporting countries should, either by voluntary decision or by
international agreement, restrict the flow of information from their
countries. They believe that lesser developed countries should do re-
search on gathering information. Last, they claim that developing
countries should form their own regional communication agreements."
The NIIO claims also contain some specific policy proposals con-
sistent with the controlled flow view.8' With respect to developing na-
tions, these goals include exchanging information on as broad a scale as
possible; paying particular attention to the work of national news agen-
cies; training professionals; "inculcating the values of the new interna-
tional economic order and the new world information order""2 ; democ-
ratizing information resources and structures; and establishing "a free
and equitable flow between developed and developing countries, from
the point of view of content, volume, and intensity. ' 'a3 With respect to
the already-developed nations, some of these policy suggestions involve
calling public attention to growing world interdependence; "taking a
more objective approach to the aspirations and concerns of the devel-
oping nations""; using more space in Western newspapers for articles
about development; making certain that journalists respect the laws
and customs of the host country; and giving special attention to the
expanding national news agencies. Regarding international organiza-
tions, suggested policies aim at instituting a tax in the developed coun-
tries to finance the UNESCO copyright fund;65 helping to fund training
79. See id. at 141-42.
80. Rao, Information Imbalance: A Closer Look, in CRISIS IN INTERNATIONAL NEWS:
POLICIES AND PROSPECTS 140, 149-50 (J. Richstad & M. Anderson eds. 1981).
81. Masmoudi, supra note 26, at 178-85.
82. Id. at 179.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 180.
85. Id. at 182.
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centers and coordinating the curricula of mass media institutes; help-
ing to create training centers for Third World nations to produce radio
and television programs "designed to serve the aims of the New Inter-
national Economic Order""; and devising satellite policies which will
respect the sovereignty of each state.
The primary benefits of the controlled flow solutions are their con-
sistency and single-mindedness. However, the first weakness of the
limited flow approach lies in its very consistency: it simply does not
take into account the demands of developed nations. A second weak-
ness is that some of its suggested policies are much like asking certain
Western organizations to sign their own death warrant. For example,
the Washington Post should not be forced to print articles about high-
way-building in Uganda, a topic which is of importance and interest to
the Third World, but of almost no interest to the Post's readership. It
is, at the very least, presumptuous of Third World nations to tell the
Post to sacrifice its profits just to satisfy the Third World view of fair-
ness, a view based on very different norms from the American
conceptions.
Additionally, some of the proposals are simply impractical. The
tax on Western nations to administer the UNESCO copyright fund will
primarily benefit the South. Should not the South, then, pay some of
the tax? The implicit or explicit suggestion for the developing coun-
tries to restrict information in order to return to their historical past is
unreasonable because it is unrealistic to try to turn back the clock.
Without question, many elements of the native cultures legitimately
deserve preservation, but this need not entail complete isolation from
Western influences. The most serious weakness in these proposals is
that they unquestionably limit the freedoms of speech and expression
which are expressly guaranteed in the Universal Declaration" and in
the ICCPR." Placing barriers on the flow of information necessarily
limits that flow and, therefore, restricts the chance for people to engage
in the broadest possible shaping and sharing of enlightenment. No
amount of "verbal acrobatics ''SS can answer this charge because a
reduced flow of information-even if that information is biased-will
surely reduce the ability of people to form opinions freely.
In contrast to this controlled flow approach, the simple free flow
argument is that there should be no restrictions on communication.
This argument, however, does not account for the legitimate griev-
86. Id. at 183.
87. U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 14.
88. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 50.
89. Swinton, A First World View, in CmsIS IN INTERNATIONAL Nxws: PouclES AND
PROSPECTS xi, xv (J. Richatad & M. Anderson eds. 1981).
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ances, as defined earlier, of the Third World. A more sophisticated free
flow policy would first stress the need for developed nations to make
clear their commitments to free flow and to doing all that is necessary
to preserve it. To further this policy suggestion, Western nations would
also grant assistance to developing nations in order to broaden literacy
and to help build up national and regional news agencies. In addition,
the example of the English Thomson program to train journalists for
the Third World, deserves expansion.'" The journalistic community it-
self should accept the burden of creating standards of fairness which
take into account the validity of Third World complaints. The theory
behind these policy suggestions is, to use a clichK, that small steps will
become big strides.
The primary strength of the free flow argument is that it recog-
nizes several facts which are unpleasant, but necessary for the Third
World to accept. First, by focusing on the internal communication pro-
cess of each nation-state, this policy acknowledges that international
flow of information can arise only among nations which have well-de-
veloped internal flows. Mr. Long of Reuters has commented: "You can-
not have repression at home and enlightenment abroad."' 1 Second, the
free flow position recognizes the naivet6 in expecting a "balanced" flow
of news."2 Unevenness is characteristic "not only of news flow, but of
water flow, oil flow, money flow, population flow, and food flow."" s A
related strength of the free flow argument is that it points out that
news is by nature piecemeal and exclusionary; it is unrealistic for the
Third World to expect the Western media to devote the same atten-
tion to the Third World as it devotes to itself.
The most significant weakness of the free flow policy is its open-
endedness. The proposal clearly supports free flow as a principle to
guide communication; however, this argument does not deal success-
fully with the problem of "swamping" or volume imbalance in informa-
tion flow. The steps suggested by Swinton" and others'" to increase
literacy do not really solve this problem in the short- or medium-term.
In brief, the free flow proposal has lost the sense of balance which was
present, in a most exaggerated way, in the controlled flow proposals.
90. Richatad & Anderson, supra note 24, at 11.
91. Long, Reuters View on UNESCO, in CRISIS IN INTERNATIONAL Ngws: POLICIES
AND PROSPECTS 274 (J. Richstad & M. Anderson eds. 1981).
92. Merrill, A Growing Controversy: The "Free Flow" of News Among Nations, in
Cmsis IN INTERNATIONAL NEws: POLICIES AND PROSPECTS 151, 154 (J. Richstad & M. An-
derson eds. 1981).
93. Id. at 156.
94. See generally Swinton, A First World View, supra note 89, at xi-xv.
95. See, e.g., Rao, supra note 80, at 141.
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Also, free flow is somewhat unclear on how far the West should go to
help the Third World. The suggestions for improvement offered by free
flow proponents are inadequately integrated with their strong position
supporting the free flow of ideas.
To summarize, the Third World view holds that "It]he power to
inform is one of the keys to power as such"" while the Western view
argues that "[w]ith all its real and alleged faults, a free press is infi-
nitely better than any alternative." From the global perspective of-
fered at the outset, free flow appears to be, despite its weaknesses, a
stronger proposal than controlled flow. The policy which this paper will
now outline will, therefore, incorporate much of the free flow argument
while taking into account the strong points of the limited flow policy,
to a great degree neglected in the free flow argument. This compromise
policy is based largely on the proposal made by the Netherlands Gov-
ernment in its report, Human Rights and Foreign Policy."
At the center of this policy lies the notion of a "free and balanced
flow of information."" This concept implies both the free flow of infor-
mation and the "availability of information which is as broad and
many-sided as possible."1 0 The absolutely critical point is that "bal-
ance" implies many-sidedness and choice, without any limitation.
Achieving balance, therefore, requires broadening rather than con-
tracting information flows. In view of this definition it is advisable to
discard the word "balance" because what is being attempted is a
broadening of the choice of sources of information offered to people.
The broadest number of options gives people the greatest opportunity
to improve their enlightenment, power and respect. "Free and
balanced flow," as an appellation, is risky because of its varying conno-
tations. While slogans and buzzwords are invariably dangerous, in the
interest of ease of exposition the term "broadened flow" will be used to
describe the policy suggested in this note.
Governmental activity should be aimed at promoting a broadened
flow by "preventing concentration and the formation of monopolies in
the provision of information. '"101 One way to achieve this goal would be
to give governmental assistance to many media groups. Broadened flow
recognizes the legitimate grievances entailed in cultural dependence,
and suggests in response, policies such as helping the Third World set
96. N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1982, § 1, at 3, col. 1.
97. Id.
98. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS, HuMAN
RiwTs AND FORE1GN POLICY 123-30 (1979).
99. Id. at 125.
10O. Id.
101. Id. at 126.
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up and advance its own regional or national information-gathering and
information-disseminating systems. In addition, giving funds to
UNESCO-sponsored programs concerning information, as well as sup-
porting private organizations dedicated to solving the communication
problem are other examples of the commitment to broadened flow. It
should be stressed again that this understanding of broadened flow
should in no way "infringe freedom of information. 1 0 2 Policies such as
censorship or licensing journalists, therefore, are not viable options. At-
tempts to impose standards like "objectivity" should be wholeheart-
edly resisted since they are tantamount to censorship.
The cautious approach which broadened flow takes toward the
NIIO/NIEO linkage shows the emphasis it places on the base values of
the communication process. It attempts to concentrate on information
and to solve the communication problem, without clouding the picture
by bringing in other values and associated problems.
The policy outlined here accepts the premise of the proponents of
controlled flow which holds that "the emancipation of the developing
countries with regard to news communication and culture can be
viewed as a natural and necessary complement to their political and
economic emancipation.1 0 3 It avoids the danger of limiting the spread
of enlightenment and the illegitimate linkage of communication base
values exclusively to wealth by strongly advocating free flow: "Free ac-
cess to information is essential if freedom of opinion is to be exercised,
since a lack of information is an impediment to forming a considered
opinion."1 "4 Furthermore,
[e]fforts to bring about a more balanced international situation
in the field of information and communication should accord-
ingly be directed towards widening the realization of freedom
of information in the world and must on no account be permit-
ted to lead to an acutal restriction of that freedom by impover-
ishing and politicizing the international provision of news.105
V. PAST TRENDS AND CONDITIONS
The compromise formula of "free and balanced flow," to say noth-
ing of the meanings attached to these terms, has rarely, if ever, been
the rule in past decisions concerning communication policy. To under-
stand past trends, it is necessary to separate customary international
102. Id.
103. Id. at 127.
104. Id. at 125.
105. Id. at 128.
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law as embodied in United Nations documents from more recent deci-
sions by U.N. subsidiaries, notably UNESCO.
The United Nations has strongly established freedom of communi-
cation as a key human right. At its first session in 1946 the General
Assembly had already agreed that this freedom is "the touchstone of
all the freedoms to which the UN is consecrated." 1" This freedom was
definitively stated as a human right in the 1948 U.N. Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, article 19:
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression;
this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interfer-
ence and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas
through any media and regardless of frontiers.' 7
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
of 1966 restates the earlier assertion with the following limitations:
For respect of the rights or reputations of others; For the pro-
tection of national security or of public order, or of public
health or morals.108
By 1966, the membership of the U.N. was substantially different
from its membership in 1948. Many former colonies had become inde-
pendent states and thereby became voting members of the U.N. Be-
cause discussion of the information issue "had petered out"'" in the
U.N. by the middle 1960's and because UNESCO is, by charter, man-
dated to study enlightenment, debate moved to UNESCO, which since
the 1950's had devoted itself to problems of specific interest to the
Third World. This organization has long been sympathetic to an im-
portant role for central authority in the state.110 At the 1972 UNESCO
General Conference, the Soviets offered a draft statement suggesting
vastly increased government control over the media.1 While this pro-
posal was soon put to rest because of its obvious unacceptability to the
West and much of the Third World, the non-aligned nations which
dominate UNESCO began to crystallize their own views on the subject
of communication. In 1973 at Algiers, they proposed "reorganiz[ing]
existing communication channels which are the legacy of the colonial
106. Id. at 123.
107. U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 14.
108. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 50.
109. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS, supra note
98, at 128.
110. Theberge, supra note 44, at 715.
111. Id. at 716.
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past. . . .""' In 1975 a group of Third World journalists underscored
the need for more reporting about the Third World, and for linking
NIIO and NIEO claims.
11
3
The Helsinki Agreement of 1975114 was the first step to modify the
old U.N. formulas. The Agreement's final act'1 aimed "to facilitate the
freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds, to encourage
cooperation in the field of information and the exchange of information
with other countries .. .11 Hinted at in the Agreement is the need
for Western help in achieving balanced flow.117 One year earlier,
UNESCO moved away from the radical Soviet view. At the 1974
UNESCO General Conference 11 free and balanced flow appeared as a
goal for the first time.11 Although conflicting Western, Soviet and
Third World views clashed at the UNESCO Nairobi Conference of
1976,130 the participants there agreed to devise a Mass Media Declara-
tion to appear in 1978.121 This Declaration made free and balanced
flow a world norm. It stated the policy goal of "a free flow and wider
and better balanced dissemination of information." ' It is safe to say
that the rapid expansion of the Third World role in the U.N. and its
subsidiaries, combined with firm Western resistance to excessive en-
croachments on free flow, brought about the compromise formula. The
report of the MacBride Commission has gone so far as to offer sugges-
tions for implementation of the new formula. 
1 3
It is important to realize that despite apparent agreement on free
and balanced flow as a policy, there is broad disagreement on a defini-
tion of terms. This note defines "balanced" as many-sided but not in
112. Richstad & Anderson, International News: Looking Ahead, in CRsSIS IN INTER-
NATIONAL NEWS: POLICIES AND PROSPECTS 402, 433 (J. Richstad & M. Anderson eds.
1981).
113. Statement by the Participants in the Dag Hamnarskjold Third World Journal-
ists' Seminar, in CRISIS IN INTERNATIONAL NEWS: POLICIES AND PROSPECTS 435-39 (J.
Richstad & M. Anderson eds. 1981).
114. 14 I.L.M. 1292-1325 (1975).
115. Id. at 1292.
116. Id. at 1315.
117. Id. The Helsinki Agreement recommends that those countries with advanced
communications assist the communications development in other countries. Id.




122. The Declaration of Fundamental Principles Concerning the Contribution of the
Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding, the Promotion of
Human Rights and to Countering Racialism, Apartheid and Incitement to War, supra
note 42.
123. MAcBRIDE REPORT, supra note 1, at 254-72.
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any way limited. In fact, most of the Third World countries who domi-
nate UNESCO have a conception of "balance" which leans more heav-
ily toward control. This is illustrated by the Third World demand in
the Masmoudi proposals for balance in volume of communication.11
4
Clearly, achieving such an equality would require that limits be placed
on the flow from the West, at least in the short- and medium-term,
until the South can develop further its own information flows.
There have been several broad developments in the communica-
tion process aside from those trends evidenced by relevant interna-
tional documents. The very fact of participation of nearly all the
world's countries in the constitutive process of communication testifies
to the trend of democratization of the process. Acceptance of the free
and balanced flow formula, however interpreted, has necessarily cre-
ated broader access. It has increased the number of participants and
alternative channels of flow, and has provided more abundant informa-
tion than existed previously. These advances point to a second broad
trend: greater cooperation, especially between the First and Third
Worlds. For example, without Western financial and technical assis-
tance, the Third World would have been unable to create its own news
bureaus." 5 TNNAs are now paying more attention to their national
and regional counterparts. Western governments are becoming more
generous in their support of UNESCO-sponsored training programs.,
Having realized that some Third World claims are legitimate, the West
has apparently decided that antagonism will not solve the disagree-
ments over communication. The realization that information is a social
commodity underlies this greater cooperation. It is interesting that co-
operation within the Third World has also markedly increased in re-
cent years. 2 '
Nevertheless, an analysis of past trends would be lacking if it did
not include the "jarring note"'2 s sounded by some Westerners, that
UNESCO has tried to use its international influence to control the me-
dia. Certain media executives like Mr. Long of Reuters have been espe-
cially critical of UNESCO's policy proposals. 29 This "jarring note" is
important because it illustrates a fundamental disagreement of an im-
124. Masmoudi, supra note 26, at 178.
125. See generally Anderson, Emerging Pattern of Global News Co-operation, in
CRISIS IN INTERNATIONAL NEWS: POLICIES AND PROSPECTS 317-43 (J. Richstad & M. An-
derson eds. 1981).
126. See Richter, World Communication Issues, in CRISIS IN INTERNATIONAL NEWS:
POLICIES AND PROSPECTS 56, 63 (J. Richstad & M. Anderson eds. 1981).
127. Anderson, supra note 125, at 318.
128. Richstad & Anderson, supra note 112, at 425.
129. Long, supra note 91.
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portant portion of the world with the developments in international
treatment of communication. Even accounting for this dissatisfaction,
it is indisputable that the overriding trend in the global communica-
tion process is the "politicized communication environment,"180 which
is evidenced by the fact that political bodies like UNESCO debate
communication problems.
The conditions causing these trends should take into account the
demands, identifications and expectations of the global community.
Unquestionably, nations and peoples have come to voice demands for
broader participation in all value and decision processes. The docu-
ments issued by international organizations of all types illustrate that
these demands are receiving serious attention. Identifications, however,
remain strongly regional. Thus, it is not surprising that the NIIO
claims were advanced and accepted by a large proportion of the South.
A few people from each part of the world, though, have attempted to
surmount their regional identifications in order to achieve globally ac-
ceptable solutions. The members of the MacBride Commission fall in
this category.18 ' The Third World has become more and more confi-
dent that its demands will be met. Such expectations grew rapidly af-
ter the discovery and use of the "oil weapon" in the early 1970's. Some
Westerners have resigned themselves to the fact that U.N. decisions
now tend uniformly to support Third World claims simply because of
the constitution of U.N. membership.
VI. FUTURE TRENDS
Should the present trend toward free and balanced flow continue,
the "immediate outlook seems to be for the growth of alternative struc-
tures for news and communication that meet, particularly, the
nonmarket-oriented needs of the developing countries."' ' Specifically,
this will mean further expansion of national news agencies, more news
pools such as the Inter Press Service, more government assistance from
developed countries, a greater role for the World Press Freedom Com-
mittee and similar private monitoring groups and in general, more
North-South dialogue with the realization that past crisis planning has
been a failure. These trends began, to some extent, in the late 1970's.
Their extension seems guaranteed by the fact that already for four
years the free and balanced flow formula has been in effect and there-
fore is becoming an accepted doctrine of international law. Nonethe-
less, the need for new policy initiatives is made clear by the unfortu-
130. Richatad & Anderson, supra note 112, at 403.
131. MAcBRiDE REPORT, supra note 1.
132. Id. at 412.
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nate fact that the World Press Freedom Committee, a Western
organization, has raised less than a million dollars since its inception in
the early 1970's."'
The trends discussed above are merely short-term and may de-
scribe the situation for the next five to ten years. The best way to
study long-term trends is to follow the Lasswell model and set up de-
velopmental constructs. 84 The two polar future scenarios are the oli-
garchic and participatory model for the mass media. The oligarchic
model stresses a monolithic media which is "power-oriented and
designed to control and manipulate people."'' This would describe a
centrally-controlled communication system, "the type of system that
would generate the kinds of Third World complaints that arose in the
1970's." IT The participatory model, in contrast, stresses diffused con-
trol over the press, with differentiated senses of identification and of
the common interest. In addition, this construct posits the dispersal of
intermediate technology throughout the world. Because neither model
provides a satisfactory solution, room for change lies between the two
outlooks. Such change arguably can take two forms: cosmetic and
structural."1
7
Cosmetic change, because it is not definitive, ultimately must be
followed by structural change. The cosmetic changes can seem perma-
nent, though, if the frame of reference used to observe the process is of
long enough duration. Cosmetic change tries to deal with problems
pragmatically and consecutively, rather than contextually. It fosters
"benevolent paternalism"'" because it necessarily concentrates on
short-term changes and does not try to make major adjustments in the
social order.
Structural or neo-Marxist change views communication in its
broader social, political or historical context. It focuses on the problem
that exists by virtue of the fact that although communication is by
definition a horizontal process, it is organized vertically. Structural
change proponents argue that the results of such change are more con-
clusive and long-term than those produced by cosmetic change.
1 8
Cosmetic change generally takes the form of increasing financial
aid from the North to the South for communication or for creating
133. Id. at 415.
134. Id. at 423-26.
135. Id. at 424.
136. Id.
137. Harris, News Dependence and Structural Change, in CRsIs IN INTENATIONAL
NEWS: POLICIES AND PROSPECTS 356, 358 (J. Richstad & M. Anderson eds. 1981).
138. Id. at 359.
139. Id. at 361.
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training programs for Third World journalists. An example of struc-
tural change is the development of organizations like the Inter Press
Service (IPS), which is officially a nongovernment organization. 40
Founded in 1972, this group is a full international news service with
subscribers and correspondents in Asia, Africa, Latin America and
both Western and Eastern Europe. It employs two hundred full-time
correspondents and publishes 90,000 words per day. It claims to report
facts, in particular, facts of interest to developing nations. The IPS be-
lieves that it has made great strides in solving the horizontality prob-
lem by allowing national news agencies to link up with it under mutual
exchange agreements. By "maintaining its own status as just one in-
strument of information among others," 1" it strives to guarantee a
Third World communication network where all nations are represented
on an equal basis.
Despite its strength, the IPS raises the question of where the dif-
ference between cosmetic and structural change lies. While Harris co-
gently argues that the IPS exemplifies structural change,"" more radi-
cal representatives of the Third World might argue that it is only
cosmetic; that structural change can come about only by refusing to
allow any Western news in this region. The cosmetic/structural prism,
therefore, is unsatisfactory because of the subjectivity it entails. It also
fails to relate clearly enough the changes made with the broader global
policies posited. For example, the relationship between the IPS and
free and balanced flow is tenuous because the cosmetic/structural
mode of analysis has inadequately defined the policy desired to expand
communication. The IPS can mean different things in different con-
ceptions of balance.
VII. APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATION
Because of the definitional problems, what is more necessary than
the consideration of cosmetic or structural solutions is an attempt to
return to the basic policy in all fields of human rights: changing per-
spectives. This must take the form of a comprehensive perspective on
communication processes and information products, with the emphasis
on the broadest communication processes as a means to the most vera-
cious information products. The first stage of that development has
been completed: communication is recognized throughout the world as
a legitimate human right. The second stage, convincing people of the
necessity of broadened flow, has just begun. As efforts are made to
140. Id. at 364-66.
141. Id. at 366.
142. Id. at 364-66.
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show how this policy is consistent with expanding the shaping and
sharing of enlightenment, power and respect, those who engage in
changing perspectives must be very clear about their interpretation of
free and balanced flow. The MacBride Commission's recommendations
are an attempt to implement one such interpretation.14
The basic perspective-altering proposals the MacBride Commis-
sion suggests include linking communication to social, cultural, eco-
nomic and political goals; developing national languages; making ele-
mentary education universally available; and letting each country work
out its communication policies in the framework of national develop-
ment policies. It would be difficult to quarrel with these suggestions
because they aim at changing perspectives in the broadest way. Criti-
cism of the MacBride Report has focused on its specific proposals to
reduce commercialization in communication and to impose tariffs for
news transmission. This criticism is of Western origin and concludes
that the implementation of these proposals would result in a limitation
of the flow of information in global communication channels.1 4 4 Much
of this criticism is valid. The MacBride Commission interpreted bal-
ance to stress limitation over broadening and choice. While the Mac-
Bride proposals have been successful in pointing out the existence of
the communication problem, they have ignored the truism that restric-
tions on the flow of information reduce the opportunity for people to
become enlightened, powerful and respected citizens. More communi-
cation is better than less. Once the communication flows, it can always
be ignored. But if people are not permitted certain kinds of informa-
tion, they cannot fully participate in the sharing of these base values
and have therefore suffered a deprivation of human rights. The Mac-
Bride Commission's failure can be traced to the fact that the political
ideologies of its members colored its analysis to the extent that the
right to communication was subsumed into other political or economic
rights, and was not treated as itself universal, inalienable and
unabridgeable. The only policy which combines the concerns of cul-
tural dependence with the necessity for the broadest possible flow of
information is "broadened flow" with emphasis on many-sidedness and
choice, and not on quantitative restriction aimed at artificially creating
equal, balanced flows.
The nations dedicated to the definition of broadened flow as ad-
vanced in this note will have the especially difficult task of convincing
other members of the world community to change their understanding
of free and balanced flow. These other nations are largely committed to
143. MAcBRIDE REPORT, supra note 1, at 253-75.
144. Richstad & Anderson, supra note 112, at 425.
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the work of the MacBride Commission. The countries that recognize
the dangers inherent in the MacBride proposals must take their case to
the appropriate international fora and present their arguments with
the same force and urgency as the Third World nations have done in
support of the NIIO proposals. They should use all existing channels of
communication to convince the rest of the world of the truth of their
argument. Only in this way will perspectives be changed with the result
being an expansion of human rights.
The possibility that the matrix of the communication debate may
move out of UNESCO and into the U.N. General Assembly has been
raised. If this develops, proponents of broadened flow would have to
increase their vigilance. The larger size of the General Assembly as
compared to UNESCO, as well as its greater acceptance as a legitimate
legislative body, will mean that more nations favorable to the Third
World understanding of free and balanced flow would participate in
shaping the outcomes of the communication debate. This result would
endanger broadened flow still further.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Changing perspectives in a comprehensive way, so as to affect pro-
cess and product, is difficult because of its very abstractness. It is al-
ways easier to achieve passage of a specific policy than to alter an es-
tablished mindset. The Third World, however, was successful in
changing perspectives so that many members of the world community
have come to accept their view of the communication process. There is
no reason why, with hard work and imagination, countries that recog-
nize the flaws and dangers in the existing policy cannot be equally ef-
fective in changing perspectives.
The problem of communication is soluble. The existence of a
global negotiating process through UNESCO shows that the First, Sec-
ond and Third Worlds are all interested in solution. For those who see
that there is much to be done to increase the flow of information, the
road ahead is long and difficult. But as with so many other problems,
the farther away the solution appears, the more challenging and re-
warding a goal it becomes.
Ronald A. Lehmann
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